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ASPECTS OF AUTOMATION
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by
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the Degree of Master Science in Engineering and Management
ABSTRACT Complex systems such as commercial aircraft are difficult for
operators to manage. Designers, intending to simplify the interface between the
operator and the system, have introduced automation to assist the operator. In
most cases, the automation has helped the operator, but at times operator
confusion as to what the automation is doing has created dangerous situations
that lead to property damage or loss of life. This problem, known as mode
confusion, has been difficult to analyze and thus solutions tend to be reactive
instead of proactive. This thesis examines mode confusion as an emergent
property of the operator and the automation. It develops models of the
automation and the operator and then studies their emergent behavior. It then
applies the model in a case study.
Thesis Supervisor: Nancy G. Leveson
Tide: Professor of Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In 1979 at 29,800 ft, an Aeromexico
DC-10 stalled over Luxembourg. While
stalls in a small private airplane such as a
Cessna 172 can be alarming when
unexpected, it is not dangerous as long
as the pilot is alert and the aircraft is high
Figure 1 Damage to Aeromexico Flight enough. In the case of the DC-10,
945(Anonymous, 1980) however there was significant damage
with approximately 4ft of control surface
lost off its horizontal stabilizer (Figure 1). The subsequent accident report faulted
the pilots for failing to follow proper climbout procedures.
More recently, an Air Libert6 Tunisie DC-9 overshot the runway while landing at
Kajaani airport in Finland on November 3, 1994(Figure 2). The aircraft executed
the final approach with too
much speed, resulting in the
aircraft touching down 600 ft
beyond the normal
touchdown point. The
Finnish aviation authorities
cited the crew for poor crew
resource management and
improper approach and Figure 2 Kajaani Crash(Aircraft accrdent at kajaani
airport,finland, 3 november 1994, 1996)
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braking technique
Even more recently, American Airlines flight 965 on approach to Cali, Columbia
crashed into a mountain on December 20, 1995. In this case, the Cali crew set up
their navigation equipment on the wrong fix causing the aircraft to follow a
course into a mountain. The Columbian aviation authorities identified the crew
as the probable cause of the accident (Cabrera et al., 1996)
In all of these incidents/accidents, the investigators cited the crews at fault for
losing the situational awareness of operating the aircraft, but these accidents also
have something else in common: Each of these accidents involved confusion
with the flight management systems.
Designers intend automation systems to reduce the crew's workload by
performing the mundane tasks associated with flying. Automation systems can
be found on simple aircraft such as Cessna 172s and on more complex aircraft
such as Douglas MD11s. For the Cessna 172, the automation provides for
simple axis control and can aid in holding a course. This system is great for
occasional pilots who are in the air and flying from point A to point B. For the
MD1 1, the system is far more complicated. While it also controls the bank of the
wings and direction of the aircraft, it also controls the thrust of the engines, the
altitude of the aircraft, the speed of the aircraft, and more. Additionally these
systems may provide for supervising the pilot in regard for safe flight. For
example, Vakil (Vakil et al., 1996) describes the Airbus 320 automation that
protects a plane from exceeding various airspeed limitations during flap
deployment.
For all their complexity, these systems need to interface with the pilots. There are
a number of tensions associated with this. First, there are limitations concerning
space on an aircraft. When one examines the flight deck of an MD-11, one is
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struck by the limited space. There is simply not enough room to put all of the
instrumentation related to flight management at the hands of a single operator.
Additionally there is a need for humans to monitor effectively the automation,
and so an automation system that has a great deal of inputs and outputs would be
very difficult to use. A designer needs to consider how to present enough
information to the operator as to what the automation is doing without
overwhelming him with lots of extra information.
An approach taken by automation designers to provide manageable interfaces is
to multiplex the inputs and outputs. What this means is that depending on the
current system mode, a particular interface presents itself to the user and to the
system. In this type of system, the automation has a number of modes and
depending on which mode is active the automation behaves in a particular way.
For example, while in altitude capture mode, the automation will automatically
(without interaction from the pilot) climb and level the aircraft at a particular
altitude. This feature will not be enabled when the same automation system is in
a vertical speed mode. In this case, the automation will control the aircraft's
vertical speed (rate of climb) to the limits of the aircraft. These two automation
modes provide very unique functionality yet share the same input/output
interface to the pilot (Palmer, 1995; Rushby, 2002).
The weakness in this design is that the pilot must not only be situationally aware
of the physical environment around her, she must be aware of the state of the
automation that controls the aircraft. Any misunderstanding of what the
automation is doing can cause dangerous confusions called mode confusions in the
mind of the pilot.
Reexamining the accidents described earlier in this chapter, one can gain a sense
of the problems of mode confusion. In the Aeromexico flight, the accident
report speculated that the most likely scenario as to why the aircraft stalled was
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that the autopilot system was set to a vertical speed mode and the auto throttle
system was set to maintain an airspeed. This was different from the recollection
of the aircrew, who recalled setting the autopilot to maintain an airspeed and the
auto throttle to maintain a certain engine speed (Ni). The difference was that the
former would create a situation where the aircraft would not maintain
performance as it gained altitude without pilot intervention. The report
speculates that the accidental toggling of a single dial might have led to the pilots
thinking the automation was set to the other setting.
For the Kajaani crash, the situation was that while the aircraft was on final
approach to the airport, the captain took the responsibility of flying the aircraft
from the copilot. During this time, the report speculated that when the captain
attempted to toggle off the auto throttle system, he accidentally toggled the
takeoff-go-around (TOGA) button. The effect of this was the automation
increased the power of the engines to maximum thrust. The captain physically
reduced power using the throttles and disengaged the auto throttle system leading
him to believe that the thrust was at idle when in fact it was not. These mistakes
lead to the aircraft crossing the runway threshold 24 knots faster than normal and
preventing the braking mechanism from deploying because the thrust was not at
idle. The extra speed and poor braking caused the aircraft to slip off the runway.
All of these accident reports were critical of the aircrews for losing situational
awareness. Even so, the pilot is only one part of the overall system. The
automation design plays a very important part of creating and maintaining that
situational awareness and in each of these cases, the automation led the pilots into
a trap. These reports recommend better training for the aircrews, but do not
make recommendations as to fixing the inherent design flaws of the automation
systems.
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When one says there are inherent design flaws, one would expect that a designer
should be able to do his job better. Unfortunately designers tend to view the
operator in a somewhat dismissive way (Amalberti, 1998), as if the problems
operators have with the automation are entirely the fault of the operators. The
reality is that mode confusion is the result of the emergent behavior of the
automation with the operator and thus to find mode confusion problems, one
must have a model of both.
This thesis develops and proposes such a model. The model combines both an
operator model and an automation model and examines the emergent behavior.
The examination of this behavior can help identify mode confusion problems in
the system.
The contents of the thesis is as follows
Chapter 2 is a literature review examining the state of knowledge of mode
confusion problems.
Chapter 3 deals with framing the mode confusion problem as a systems problem
and develops the model of the automation.
Chapter 4 discusses and develops a model of the operator.
Chapter 5 examines the emergent behavior of the operator model and the system
model.
Chapter 6 utilizes the model developed in chapters 3-5 in a case study
Chapter 7 applies the model to a general framework for mode confusion
Chapter 8 provides the conclusion
15
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Research in mode confusion is ongoing. Much of the research has focused on
cases of incidents and accidents that resulted from mode confusion problems.
For these cases, researchers model mode confusion using state machines and
draw insights from these models. To date no researcher has developed a means
of analyzing an automation design for mode confusion potential.
Degani and Heymann
Degani and Heymann and their collaborators(Degani et al, 2002; Heymann et al,
2002, 2007 (Expected)) examine the problem of mode confusion by developing
state machine models of the user and the system and examining the consistency
between the two. They start identifying the machine model by defining the
system's behavior in terms of states and external events. They also develop a user
model that is a state machine by examining the states and events that are visible
to the operator. They categorize the user and machine states into disjoint sets
such that each set represents some task specification (i.e. a goal).
They then examine the state transitions for both the user model and the machine
model for each task specification. They look at when the two model diverge
when handling events (i.e. when one model remains in a task specification and
the other model leaves it) If one model enters a state that lies in a separate task
specification than the other model, then there is an error and mode confusion
will result.
19
Critique
While Heymann and Degani are consistent with the idea that the operator must
have the correct internal model of the system, they run into problems because
their model relegates the human to monitoring the automation system. In their
world, the user simply follows the automation and as long as there is feedback
from the automation system to the user, there should be no difficulty. For
example, when one considers the "bust-the-capture" scenario as described by
Palmer (Palmer, 1995), if the automation simply had a visual feedback to the user
indicating that capture mode is no longer active, their model would not indicate
an error.
The reality is that mode confusion accidents occur despite feedback to the user.
These occur because the user has an expectation that the automation is consistent
with his goals and tends to ignore subtle and not so subtle indications that the
automation is in an incorrect state. For example, the Kajaani accident (Aircraft
accident at kajaani airport, finland, 3 november 1994, 1996) resulted when the aircraft
had too much speed as it crossed the runway threshold on landing. This extra
speed was the result of the automation in a mode where it would add full throttle
even after the pilot would reduce the engine power to idle. Clearly, the pilot had
feedback-he had to fight to keep the throttle at idle-yet mode confusion still
occurred.
Leveson
Leveson(Leveson et al, 1997) creates a mode-based model similar to Degani in
that it represents the controller black box behavior at human-controller interface.
Leveson goes beyond Degani by incorporating two other state machine models:
One model represents the supervisory states; the other model representing the
state of the controlled system. The addition of two models to Degani's state
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machine model allows Leveson to examine mode confusion problems in finer
detail than Degani. Another aspect of Leveson's work is that she separates mode
confusion problems into six different categories. These will be described later in
Chapter 7.
Critique
The difficulty in Leveson's model is that it does not consider the state of mind of
the pilot. Mode confusion cannot occur if the mode is consistent with what the
pilot expects regardless if it appears clumsy to other pilots. For example, when
we look at the "Bust the altitude capture problem", there is no mode confusion
problem if the pilot intends to set a vertical speed and not capture the altitude.
The key point here is that in most cases, the pilot does not have the intention to
disable the altitude hold and thus the pilot has a different expectation of what the
automation will do on actuation of the vertical speed wheel.
Bredereke and Lankenau
Bredereke and Lankenau(Brederake et al, 2005) examine the problem by
modeling the system and the operator as a set of sequential event traces called a
process. Of these traces, some sequences led to certain events while other
sequences will block events. The subsets that block events are considered
failures of the process. The argument states that mode confusion occurs when
the actual process contains traces or failures that do not exist in the mental model
of the process. From these statements, they develop a series of heuristics to
avoid the problem.
Critique
The strength of Bredereke's argument is that it treats mode confusion as a
dynamic problem. Here his group considers mode confusion potential to be the
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existence of automation trajectories that do not match what the user considers to
be valid trajectories. This is exactly the concept of observable and controllable
states with the user acting as the controller and the automation acting as a system.
While in general I like this approach, my problem with it is that it loses the
perspective of the operator. The operator uses the system to accomplish
something and this context is important in terms of understanding just what
mode confusion is. For example, when one considers the "bust-the-capture"
scenario, it is the motivations of the operator that determines whether mode
confusion will occur.
Without the context in which the operator uses the system, it would be very
difficult to develop a model that can be checked and understood by the operator.
Bredereke's approach does not exclude such a model.
Rushby
Similar to Degani, Rushby(Rushby, 2002) examines the problem of mode
confusion using two state machines: One state machine represents the user
mental model and the other machine represents the system model. The state
machines are specified to run in a state model checker called "Mury". The
models are executed by running the events space of both models. Mury reports
errors whenever the two models end up in different states given the same
sequence of events. Rushby asserts that these errors represent automation
surprises.
Critique
Rushby's approach is similar to Heymann's and Degani's approach with the
additional aspect that it is an executable model. The nice feature of Rushby's
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approach is that whenever Murp identifies mode confusions, it is easy to check
possible solutions by simply recoding the model in Mury and reexecuting.
There is a fundamental problem, however. Rushby makes many assumptions as
to what the pilot's mental model is. When the problem is well understood, such
as the "kill the capture bust" scenario (Palmer, 1995) he used to illustrate his
point, it is fairly easy to come up with a user model. He knows that the heart of
the problem is that the pilot does not realize that under certain circumstances
actuated the vertical speed control will run counter to his overall goal of reaching
and maintaining a particular altitude and creates his user model accordingly. For
designers of automation without the experience of hindsight it would be very
difficult to assume that the mental model of the pilots would be any different
than the system model.
23
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Chapter 3
THE SYSTEM
When we consider examples of mode confusion errors, we are considering the
state of mind of the operator. The operator is confused as to the state of a
system and the resulting error causes the operator to mishandle the system.
Without the operator or the system, the problem is by definition not a mode
confusion problem. Similarly, if two systems A and B perform the same
function, the combination of system A and the operator may yield a mode
confusion problem, but the combination of system B and the operator may not.
This suggests that the mode confusion problem is an emergent property of the
operator and the system and thus cannot be analyzed with the operator or the
system in isolation. To analyze the problem we need to model both the system
and the operator.
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Figure 3 General Architectural View of System
The first thing to consider is the model of the system. Figure 3 shows the system
in terms of what needs to be considered by designers of the system. The
important consideration of the system is that mode confusion occurs in the
operational sense and not in the design or construction sense. Considering only
the operational view of the system, one can decompose the system as shown
below in Figure 4.
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S"" . r{ Operators 
Avaability to Operator jc
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Figure 4 Operational view of the system
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-4operation
Figure 4 shows that system operation requires consideration to constraints on
operation, the value delivery, the availability to the operator, and the operators
themselves. In this context, the operators are considered the actors necessary for
the system to deliver the benefit of the system. The system does not exist in
isolation-it interacts with other systems and to control the resulting behaviors,
the system has constraints in how it can be operated. Examples of constraints
given in the picture include regulatory constraints (e.g. nuclear system operations
are highly constrained by regulation), economic constraints (e.g. the system must
be profitable), safety constraints (i.e. the system must avoid hazards), and lifecycle
(i.e. the system must be maintained and retired at end of life).
Since mode confusion requires both the operator and the system, we only
consider the case when the system is actually available to the operator. Even
though delivery to the operator is salient to the operation of the system, we will
assume that the system has already been delivered to the operator. Availability to
the operator will be assumed.
While Figure 4 shows the various components of the system necessary to operate
it, the figure tends to suppress the active nature of the operator. A better view of
this is shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5 Operator Controlling the System to deliver Value
The figure shows that the system exhibits value and constraints. A new concept
introduced by the figure is the state is related to the value of the system. The
system state is a time varying property and reflects both the internal state such as
configuration of the system as well as the external state such as location. There
are certainly systems that exhibit value based on a static state. Examples of these
are batteries that are valuable when fully charged; paintings that are valuable when
important artists painted them; or homes that are valuable when they can be
occupied. These systems do not require operators because the value is inherent
in the state of the system. For the systems we will consider, the value is related to
the change of state and thus requires an operation (and an operator) to generate
value. For airplane systems, for example, value is generated as the state of the
aircraft changes from empty to full (internal state) and the location state changes
from point A to point B (external state). In any case, the operator manages the
state changes subject to constraints for the purpose of generating value.
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While Figure 5 is useful for highlighting the role that the operator plays in
delivering value using the system, the view it presents is too high level to examine
the role of automation in the system. The system must be decomposed further
to examine how the automation interacts with the operator.
Hawkins (Hawkins, 1993) identifies the goals of aviation automation as: (1) to
improve the performance of the system; (2) to reduce workload on the operators;
and (3) to improve the operating economy of the system.
When one considers the performance of the system, we are considering those
aspects of the system that impact the immediate value delivery. For example, a
feature of an autopilot for a Cessna 172 is a wing-leveling mode. While the
autopilot is active, the automation will maintain the wings level, thus improving
the performance of the aircraft in maintaining an accurate course. This also
improves the comfort of the passengers. For automation to manage the
performance of the system, it must have some ability to measure the performance
variable, and it must have the means of actuating some aspect of the system that
affects the variable. In other words, it must be able to measure and affect the
state of the system.
Considering the reduction of the operator workload, the intent is to relieve the
operator of constantly monitoring some parameter. The automation in this case
behaves as a supervisory control with the operator providing set point
information to automation. In this scenario, the automation is an interface
between the operator and the system where the operator specifies a target
indication and the automation provides performance indications that indicate
how well it meets the target.
When the automation is improving the economic performance of the system, it is
actually measuring the state of the system and providing feedback either to the
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operator or directly to the system over some trajectory that minimizes some cost
to the system. A good example of this is found in car computers that calculate an
optimal fuel/air mix ratio to maximize fuel economy. This information is fed
back directly to valves that control airflow and fuel into the car engine. In other
cases, the information is provided to the operator who has the option to utilize
the information or not.
Automation also serves to improve the safety performance of a system(Leveson
et al., 1997). In this case, the automation may provide automatic monitoring of
constraints. If the system violates these constraints, then the automation may
notify the operator or it may provide direct inputs to the system to transform its
state from a hazardous to a non-hazardous state.
Incorporating these ideas into the model shown in Figure 5 gives the model
shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6 System with Automation
The figure still is inaccurate. The figure fails to indicate the stateful nature of
automation. In complex systems utilizing automation, a stateless automation
would be complex to the point of be unusable. For example, a pilot can use an
autopilot system to navigate a course from point A to point B or execute a
precision approach to an airport. These functions are fundamentally different
and are configured and utilized by the pilot in different ways. While it is possible
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to provide separate interfaces, the functions do not need to be provided at the
same time and so providing the interfaces simultaneously is wasteful. Instead, the
interfaces are shared and automation states allow the functions to be accessed at
separate times. Leveson (Leveson et al, 1997) provides state machine models to
represent both the state of the system and the state of the automation. She
indicates that the automation, the user interface and the system have their own
state machine representation. These ideas are incorporated in Figure 7
System
state
f(,J)dt Vau
onstraints
Opaeato
Time t'
Automated 
E l
StatefulEU Us r
0 Interface
Displays Controls
"""""" Controlling to Maximize
Value Subject to Constraints
P, Operator I 
Figure 7 System and Stateful Automation
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The picture shows that system exhibits constraints, a system state, and a value.
The system also contains automation that provides some level of automatic and
supervisory control. The automation itself includes an interface with an interface
state and a separate automation state.
When one examines the figure, one notices that the automation state changes
may not contribute to the value measure. This is not to say that the automation is
not valuable. The value is a measure of the primary benefit of the system. The
automation simply exists to help to operator achieve the value.
A very important point to understand this model is that the automation is
designed and constructed anticipating a certain range of states for the system-
the design envelope of the system. It is the tool of the operator but it also constrains
the operator in that it filters information to the operator and it filters information
from the operator to the system. In this sense, the automation enforces a polig
on the operator. The problem is that when the system deviates from the
anticipated states it is difficult to modify the automation outside of the designer's
intent in response. This is the operator's responsibility and is the topic of the
next chapter.
35
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Chapter 4
THE OPERATOR
In Chapter 3, this thesis developed a system model, but only created a place
holder for the operator. To bring meaning to the mode confusion model, one
must investigate the operator and how he contributes to the overall problem of
mode confusion.
As indicated by the previous chapter, the automation is the tool of the operator in
order to help him achieve value generation of the system. The operator
understands what he wants the system to do, and he responds to situations that
are outside of the design envelope of the automation.
Unlike a mechanical system, an operator is a human being and is therefore fuzzy
in definition. This section will examine and isolate this fuzziness in order to
develop a model of the operator.
System
syse
state
Beneficiary Value
Constraints sta at
= 9 Time t'
Vauu~bject to Constraints
Operator -
Figure 8 The Operator in the System
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Figure 8 shows the operator in relation to the system. The figure shows the
operator delivering some value to a beneficiary by changing the state of the
system. This intention is important because it provides the overall context of the
operator's purpose in using the system.
System
state
Value Gan, State
By~u( Doing Tasks
\ N ( GOAL Stte
Figure 9 The Operator Delivering Value
Figure 9 expands on the act of delivering. In this figure, the value becomes the
goal of the operator. She knows that by executing certain tasks, the system will
transition from the current state to a "value state". This value state represents the
change in the system providing value to the system beneficiary.
In complex systems, controlling the system from an initial state to a value state is
not a monolithic operation. The operator executes a series of tasks that has the
effect of changing the system state along some discrete trajectory (Figure 10).
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Figure 10 The Trajectory of System States
Each transition from one state to the next may have its own goals and tasks to
accomplish that goal. Thus, as the state of the system changes the immediate
goal changes. Goals are measurable in terms of system state and thus the
operator accomplishes it by driving the system along some state trajectory from
the current state to the goal state. For example, say a person intends to drive
from Boston, Massachusetts to Portland, Maine. She starts from the parking lot
next to her Beacon Hill apartment and next she creates the immediate goal of
getting on to Beacon Street. In choosing her goal, she creates a task in her mind
to accomplish it. As she drives through the lot to Beacon Street, she is
constantly comparing her system state to the goal she has and adjusts her tasks
and goals accordingly. The representation of monolithic tasks in the mind of the
operator could be represented as shown in Figure 11 . Here there is an
immediate goal (Goal) that represents immediate reason for the task at hand.
The higher goal (represented as the cloud labeled "GOAL") represents the
intention of doing that task.
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Figure 11 A view of a Monolithic Task in the Context of a Higher Goal
While Figure 9 and Figure 11 show a simplified view of how a person uses a
system to deliver a benefit, it neglects the fact that operators are individuals and
one individual will behave differently than another. Endsley (Endsley, 2000)
indicates that there are individual factors involved in both the perception of the
system state and formulating a response. If the woman described in my previous
example is a physician and witnesses a person having a heart attack, she might
change her goal from driving to Beacon Street to giving medical assistance. If she
is not a physician then her goal might be to call for paramedics. The choice of
goals and associated tasks depend on one or more individual factors and these
need to be accounted for.
Given a current system state and a terminal value state, individuals must choose
what the next state should be. If individuals were machines, one would expect
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that choosing the next step would be deterministic. Unfortunately, individuals
are a little fuzzier in their behavior and thus an individual may feel that there are
many ways to achieve the final goal state and has to choose one of many possible
paths as the next step (Figure 12).
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Figure 12 Choosing What to do Next
Even if there was a clear "next state" and thus the next goal is clear to the
operator, it may be that there are many options available to the individual to get
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to the next goal. Each option describes a task and an associated metric that
measures the accomplishment of the task. This is illustrated in Figure 13 where
the individual faces many possible tasks to achieve a goal.
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Figure 13 Many Ways to get to the Next State
The preference of choosing the next goal and the tasks to accomplish that goal is
dependent on the individual. These individual factors make it rather difficult to
model an operator because there needs to be some determinism in order to
predict how he operates a system.
To judge whether individual factors can be eliminated from the operator model,
one must consider what individual factors are. Briefly, these factors and their
impact on operator response include:
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Psychology: Individual psychology is very important
when responding to system events. A person prone
to rigorously follow rules may have a problem
responding to system events that exceed what has
been described about the system. A very bright
person may not be suitable as an operator of a
production line.
Figure 14 Individual Factors
Physical ability: As in basic needs, a person may make a choice in tasks and goals
depending on how ably they can execute these tasks. This along with psychology
comprises Endsley's view of individual ability(Endsley, 2000).
Experience: A user who has experienced certain behaviors using the system or
analogous systems may adjust his task and goal selection depending on whether
or not that behavior is desired.
Expectations: A person who anticipates a certain system event may choose tasks
differently then when the event is not expected.
Intentions: The intentions of the operator have a strong impact on task and goal
selection. Endsley discusses this in terms of goals and objectives(Endsley, 2000).
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The many permutations of these
factors could add a great deal of
complexity to the operator model. Variation
in
A better approach might be to take > Behavior
C 0L
advantage of the fact that in some
cases operators have similar
characteristics that cause them to Normin
choose similar goals and tasks given
a certain system state and intent.
Some systems lend themselves to Figure 15 Transforming Individuals to operators
this norming of operators and some
do not. For example, most persons who are physically capable can ride a bike. If
one looks at each operator of a bicycle system, just about every response factor is
quite different from person to person except the physical capability. If one
considers another system such as an aircraft system, one discovers that there are
federal restrictions as to who can be a pilot and under what circumstances the
individual can fly. These restrictions normalize the response factors such that the
way individuals respond to various events while operating an aircraft are similar
across the collection of people who are considered pilots. Figure 16 shows other
means of norming the behavior of operators.
s i A normed operator is an operator
-
who can expect to come up with the
same tasks and same goals given a
tS crn!in certain system state. The key is to
identify those goals and tasks given
Figure 16 Methods of Norming certain system events.
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Figure 17 Normed Operator Choosing Task and Goal
Figure 17 shows the system with the normed operator. With a normed operator,
the individual is expected to choose a new goal and tasks to achieve that goal in a
more deterministic way than non-normed operators. The process for the
operator is as follows:
1. The operator observes a system state and evaluates it against his
expectations along the state trajectory of the system. His expectations are
based on the higher level goal (GOAL), which is his intention.
2. The operator is a normed operator and thus chooses the next goal state in
a predictable way.
3. The operator is a normed operator and chooses a task and an associated
completion metric in a predictable way. The operator executes this task
to transition to the next state.
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Referring back to Figure 10 (See page 41), the system is shown following a
trajectory from the current state to a value state. To drive the system from one
state to the next is generally not a monolithic operation in that there is a single
task to accomplish. At the highest level, the operator wants to move the system
from the start state to the value state and thus has an associated goal. At the next
level, the operator, having driven the system from the initial state to state I, has
the goal of moving the system to state i+1. The overall intention remains
unchanged-to move the system from the start state to the value state, but the
immediate goal is to move from the current state to the next state. This is shown
in Figure 18.
Similarly, the tasks involved in moving the system to state i+1 may not be
themselves monolithic. The operator may have a number of tasks to accomplish
that may not meaningfully change the state of the system. For example, assume
that the operator is a pilot on an aircraft on an instrument approach to an airport.
The overall goal is to transport people from airport 1 to airport 2 and the task
that occurs on the system state trajectory is to land the aircraft. Tasks such as
tuning the radio, contacting approach control, acquiring the final approach fix,
and so forth do not necessarily change the state of the aircraft system such that
more value is achieved or more costs are assumed, but they are necessary tasks in
accomplishing the state change from "on instrument approach" to "plane on the
ground". When we examine one of these subtasks, "tune the radio" the intent
remains "land the aircraft". Thus, in the operator's mind there is a hierarchy of
goals and associated tasks (Figure 19) with the immediate higher-level goal
serving as the intent of the current goal.
48
GOAL Value
- State StateGOAL is
Intent of
Goal Task S - J .
1+1 Metri
Figure 18-Intent of Tasks
GOAL
str ValueGoal state 0 Se
is Intent
Of
Goal _.. .._.Task.-
metric Z L.1
Goal
is Intent
of
Goal1 ~ ~ Ts ____
I. 4en
Figure 19 Intent of Subtasks
When one accomplishes tasks at the lowest level, one must ensure that the
accomplishment of these tasks remain consistent with the accomplishment of the
higher level goals. In the previous example, if I tune my radio, I should tune it to
the approach control frequency, not some random frequency.
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That said the tasks required to tune the radio remain the same regardless of the
intent of the operator. For example, there are a number of occasions when a
pilot will tune a radio. He will tune a radio when needs to get ATIS information
prior to takeoff or landing, he will tune a radio when he needs clearance delivery,
he will tune a radio when he needs to deliver a pilot report of weather and so
forth. In each case, the task associated with tuning the radio doesn't change, only
the metric--e.g. the frequency-changes. If the tasks associated with tuning the
radio changed depending on intent, then operators can be confused. From the
systems perspective, this means that a component has knowledge of the emergent
behavior and thus is coupled with higher level goals. This is an increase the
burden of the operator who must manage these tasks.
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critical review. In Endsley, M. R.et al. (Eds.), Situational awareness analysis
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Chapter 5
INTERACTIONS
Chapter 3 created a model of a system that requires some operator to manage the
state transitions. The system was further developed to show an automated
controller and an interface that each had states that changed the information
presented to the operator as she was driving the system.
Chapter 4 examined the operator. Operators are human beings and therefore
have unique characteristics that make modeling them difficult but by assuming
norming the model drives out their individual characteristics so that one can
assume that given identical system states and identical goals, operators will behave
similarly. The operator model is simply a hierarchical set of goals where the
higher level goals provide intent for the lower level goals.
The development of these models was done in relative isolation from one
another. The system model was developed with little consideration of the
operator. The operator in turn was developed with little consideration of the
system. The problem of mode confusion is an emergent problem and requires a
consideration of the overall system consisting of the value generating system and
the goal driven operator. This chapter will discuss the emergent behavior of such
a system.
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Figure 20 Combined Operator and System Model
Figure 20 incorporates the two models together. While this picture expresses the
operator as having a single goal with an associated task and completion metric, in
reality the operator embodies a hierarchy of goals and tasks.. These goals and
tasks change over time as the operator drives the system over a trajectory of
states. The picture also shows that the automation is stateful. The automation
changes state over time depending on external events or operator needs.
The operator considers that the overall goal of the system is to generate value by
transitioning the state of the system from an initial state to a value state. The
interface of the automation should enable the operator to monitor important
aspects of the system as it follows the state trajectory. The automation controls
some aspects of this trajectory sometimes at the discretion of the operator and at
other times enforcing some constraints on the operator. As far as the operator is
concerned, she needs to be able to measure the system state and compare them
to her own goals as to the system performance.
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For the system stakeholders, automation may serve one of a number of purposes.
These purposes have goals associated with them, but are not always the
immediate goals of the operator. For example, when we consider the
improvement of the performance of the system, the task may be transparent to
the operator but some other stakeholder may have a keen interest in the
associated goal. These tasks are designed into the automation. Other tasks are
directly assigned by the operator. When one considers the reduction of the
workload of the operator, the automation simply assumes the mechanics of
taking one aspect of an operator's goal and controlling the system such that the
operator's goal is met. For example, in the altitude hold mode of the autopilot,
the automation simply controls the aircraft such that the altitude is maintained.
The automation, in general, does not have knowledge of why the altitude is to be
maintained, it simply maintains the altitude.
55
GOAL
System
State
ilL*4 Va inVueu
Doing Task
Goal
Set up
the
Automation
Automation
Figure 21 Operator Delegating a Task to Automation
For the operator the automation simply assumes tasks. Starting from the top of
Figure 21, one sees the operator exhibiting some goal with a related task and
metric. Initially, the operator is responsible for accomplishing the goal, but in
order to reduce her workload, she wishes to have the autopilot assume the
responsibility of accomplishing this goal. The process of transferring this
responsibility is called delegating. In the operator's mind, the act of delegating a
task means that the meeting of the goal shall be accomplished by the automation.
For the automation to assume the task, it is necessary for the operator to
communicate the task and its associated metric to the automation (Figure 22).
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Since the operator is also ultimately responsible for meeting the task, he must be
able to supervise the automation such that he can monitor system performance in
the accomplishment of the task (Figure 23).
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Figure 22 Delegating a Task to Automation
To delegate successfully a task to the automation, it is necessary to communicate
the information necessary to accomplish the task via some interface. A good
interface transmits the information in an unambiguous way. When interface is
ambiguous, it can be all too easy for an operator to intend to communicate
certain task information to the automation when in reality completely different
information is provided.
Once the operator delegates a task to the automation, the operator assumes that
the automation is controlling the system with respect to the goal until the task is
accomplished or cancelled. That said, the operator is still responsible for the
successful completion of the task and needs to monitor its performance through
some interface. If the performance is incorrect, then the operator will need to
adjust the task assignment to the automation or assume the task itself. Similar to
the requirements of the interface communicating task information, the interface
conveying performance information must be unambiguous and consistent with
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the goal of the task. When the interface is ambiguous, the operator may assume
that his goals will still be met when in fact they will not be.
The accomplishment of a task means that the automation has controlled the
system such that the goal has been achieved. For example, if an operator is a
pilot of an aircraft and has the goal to fly from point A to point B, the goal is
achieved once the aircraft arrives at point B. If this goal is delegated to the
Performance Automation Goal
4.... ... ...----- -------
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Corrections
Figure 23 Operator Monitoring the Automation
automation, then the goal is achieved once the aircraft arrives at point B. When a
task is accomplished, the operator needs to be able to confirm this in her own
mind. This will allow her to indicate to herself that the goal is achieved and
follow-on tasks can be started. Thus the accomplishment of a task must be
reflected in the performance feedback to the operator.
Some tasks indicate that the system should maintain a state. An example of such
a task includes the wing-leveling feature of autopilots-the purpose here is to
maintain wings parallel to the horizon. These kinds of tasks may not have a goal
per se in that other tasks depend on it-rather these tasks simplify the
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management of the system because one aspect of the system state is maintained
by the automation instead of the operator. For the purposes of the model
described here, these tasks are no different than tasks that accomplish themselves
automatically except that these tasks are always in effect until they are cancelled.
In terms of the automation, task cancelling is when a goal is not achieved but some
event causes the automation to enter a state that is no longer goal supporting.
These events can originate from the operator, from the system itself without
operator input, or even externally from the system. If one considers the bust-the-
capture scenario(Palmer, 1995) one can see that the altitude capture of an
autopilot expresses two goals: the first goal is to climb to a specific altitude; and
the second is to hold the altitude subject to constraints of a maximum g-force on
the aircraft. Under certain circumstances, if the pilot adjusts her vertical speed,
the goal becomes cancelled and the automation assumes a new task of climb at a
specific rate. This is an example of an operator cancelling the task and delegating
a new task.
One notices that the example given above is in the perspective of the automation.
To the operator the issue of whether or not a task was cancelled and a new task
delegated depends on the operator's intent. If his intention was not to climb at a
specific rate then his goal in now inconsistent with the automation-this is mode
confusion. In general, for every task delegated to the automation, there must be a
corresponding operator goal. Secondly, for every delegated automation goal that
is cancelled, the corresponding operator goal must either be cancelled or assumed
by the operator. When these two requirements are met, the operator goals are
said to be consistent with the automation task assignments.
The automation is not static in state. The purpose of states in automation is to
separate in time the functions of the automation such that the interfaces can be
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simplified. The consequence of this is that some states support certain tasks
while other states do not. In terms of the operator, this means that some states
are goal supporfing while other states are not. Certain events may occur that change
the state of the automation from a goal supporting state to a non-goal supporting
state. The remaining discussion in this chapter will focus on this aspect of the
problem.
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Figure 24 Goal Supporting Automation States
Figure 24 shows an example of how automation may work given a user goal.
Assume an operator has a goal of driving the system to a desired state. The
automation is initially in a non-goal supporting state, but transitions to a goal
supporting state when the user enters metric information to the automation-
indicated by the (a) transition to state (1). In the course of accomplishing the
associated task, the automation will transition to state (2), and finally to an end
state indicating that the goal is accomplished. The shortest path to achieving the
goal is (1) to (2) to (End) occurring when events b and f occur. Outside of this
path are exception states-states (1) and (3)-that occur when the automation state
is (2) and events (c) or (d) occur. An exception state is a state that occurs outside
of the shortest path. Lastly, there exists two transitions-(g) and (h)-that cause
automation to go from a goal supporting state to a non-goal supporting state.
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The transition (h) only occurs when the goal has been accomplished while (g)
occurs when the goal is NOT accomplished.
The operator is responsible for monitoring the performance of the automation.
While each of the automation states (1)-(3) ultimately support the overall goal,
each state has an implication as to whether or not the goal is close to
accomplishment. The automation must be in state (2) for the automation to
accomplish the goal, but it starts in state (1). If the automation is in state (3) then
the automation may leave the goal supporting states altogether if (g) occurs
otherwise it will stay in (3) or if (e) occurs, the state will transition back to (1).
If an operator is aware of these states, he must be able to anticipate the
transitions or be at least aware that the transitions have taken place. Anticipation
requires that the operator is able to understand the purposes of each state and is
able to monitor those conditions that cause a transition from one state to the
next. In the operator's mind, these can also be goals with associated tasks and
metrics measuring task accomplishment (Figure 25). The difference is that the
automation performs these tasks with or without operator intervention. The
requirement is that the user needs to be aware of the transitions.
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Figure 25 shows the goals of each state. This does not help us understand what
will cause the operator to follow the automation. The automation may change
states and it is important that the operator follow along. If one suppresses the
automation states and simply examines how the operator follows the state, one
gets the drawing shown in Figure 26.
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Figure 26 Operator Goals
This is analogous to the automation state diagram with an important difference.
Instead of the events, one sees a special notation. For example when the
automation transitions from state (1) to (2) due to event (b), the operator is
expected to transition from Subgoall to Subgoal2 due to some events (b*x Mb
x*b). b*-inputsfrom the operator-refer to the set of all operator inputs that is
required to cause the automation to change states from (1) to (2). *b-ouputs to
the operator -refer to the set of outputs to the operator that cause her to
recognize that (1) is transitioning to (2). Mb is a matrix whose elements are either
{1,0} that indicates combinations of operator inputs and outputs as a result of
the product. If b* is {O} then there is no operator intervention necessary for the
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transition from (1) to (2) to occur. Similarly if *b is {0} then this says that the
operator is unaware that the state will transition or has transitioned from (1) to
(2). That *b is {0} and b* is {0} may not be in themselves a bad situation as long
as the operator is able to monitor the automation's performance as it
accomplishes the task related to the overall goal of the states {(1), (2), (3)}.
Mode confusion occurs when the automation no longer supports the operator
goals. Certain state transitions within the automation can occur without the
operator's knowledge because in the end the automation is still accomplishing his
goal. Other state transitions whose inputs-from-the-operator or outputs-to-the-
operator outputs are empty sets will cause confusion. For example, referring
back to Figure 26, one notices that if *g is {0} and the automation is in state (3),
then the operator will have no idea that the automation no longer supports the
overall goal. Similarly if the automation is in state (3) and g* has a transition
action caused by the operator that in some cases is consistent with the goal and in
others is not, then a confusion can occur because the automation may cancel a
goal when the operator may not intend to cancel it.
Degani and Heymann(Degani & Heymann, 2002), (Heymann & Degani, 2002),
(Heymann & Degani, 2007 (Expected))present similar ideas when they discuss
separating automation states by task specifications. In their model, they examine
the user model as a reflection of the automation interface. The model here
examines the user as motivated by the goals of utilizing the system. While the
model would have goals relating to interaction with the automation, these goals
are always in the context of a higher goal of controlling some aspect of the
system. These goals would remain the same regardless of the design of the
automation. This aspect is missing from their work.
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Chapter 6
CASE STUDY - ALARM CLOCK
Figure 27 The Author's Alarm Clock
I considered a number of systems to demonstrate my method of determining
mode confusion. Autopilot systems are attractive, but also devilishly complicated
and a good presentation of the model might get lost in expressing the many,
many states of an autopilot system. I have an alternative-my alarm clock.
While it can be said that mode confusion regarding my alarm clock may not cause
a hazardous situation, it can be used as an analogy to a system where it is critical
that an operator not be confused by its modes.
The clock used in the case study is a ten-year old Emerson model number
AK2776 Dual Alarm radio alarm clock. Like other alarm clocks, it will wake you
up with either your favorite radio station (FM or AM) or an annoying buzz. It is
unique because unlike other alarm clocks, it will store two independent alarms. It
has also caused grief over the years because it is surprisingly difficult to get it to
work consistently.
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68
Figure 28 shows the input and output interfaces for the clock. The output
interface is the front of the clock. The clock displays time in a 12-hour form with
AM and PM distinguished by an LED on the upper left corner. One also uses
the time display when setting the time or an alarm. On the lower right and left of
the display are LED indicators indicating that the clock will alarm on either the
"alarm-i" setting or the "alarm-2" setting.
The operator input interface, located on the top of the clock, provides a means
for the operator to configure and operate the clock. On the far right corner is the
Clock Radio 3-way switch. This switch allows the user to use the clock as a radio,
to enable an alarm, or to turn the clock off. Below this are controls for setting a
time-either the current time or one of the alarms. These buttons have no effect
unless one selects and holds one of the buttons {Alarm 1, Alarm 2, or Time}
located to the left. Depending on which button is pressed, the operator can
change settings associated with Alarm 1, Alarm 2, or the current time. To the left
of the Alarm buttons is the active alarm 3-way switch. This switch only has an
effect when the Clock Radio 3-way switch is in "Auto". In this case, the clock
will alarm on the Alarm 1 setting, the Alarm 2 setting, or both. This setting is fed
back to the operator through the ALM LEDs on the top of the face, but only
when the Clock Radio 3-way switch is in auto-See Figure 29, Figure 30, and
Figure 31.
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To analyze this system, one first identifies the state machines and associated
states. For simplicity, the discussion will ignore the snooze button and its
associated states. In addition, the discussion will assume that the clock is set to
the correct time and that the initial state of Alarm 1 is 6:00 AM. In general, one
should not ignore state machines and their states because mode confusion is an
emergent behavior and such simplifications may hide potential mode confusion
problems.
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The Clock Radio as State Machines
A clock radio seems like a trivial example. In reality, this clock radio expresses
many state machines. This section describes the various state machines contained
within the clock. For brevity, this thesis does not describe every state machine in
the clock. Instead, the focus is on a few state machines to demonstrate how the
goal model can show mode confusion.
Alarm clocks, in general, need to be able to display the current time and to wake
up a person at a particular time. In support of these functions, a person needs to
set a current time and set an alarm. The Emerson clock supports these functions
in a manner described below.
For the Emerson clock, the LED array (shown in Figure 28) on the front of the
clock performs the function of displaying the time. The clock wakes individuals
up via one or two alarm settings that, when fired, turns on a radio or buzzes
loudly.
In support of the primary functions, the Emerson clock also supports setting
times for the alarms and the current clock setting. Each of these functions could
be implemented by a separate set of controls, but the designers of this clock
choose to share the controls (also shown in Figure 28). To do so, they created a
number of state machines to arbitrate which function utilizes the controls and
which alarm is active.
Set Time Interface State Machine
When a user needs to set the time or an alarm, he utilizes the forward and reverse
buttons to change the time and the LED display to show the time. These
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controls can affect the alarm 1, the alarm 2, or the current time setting depending
on the state of the Set Time Interface state machine as shown in Figure 32
Set Time
a Normal
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I MOE I
Figure 32 Set Time Interface State Machine
Table 1 shows the states of the machine and the associated operator goals. Table
2 shows the transitions between states and they relate to the operator.
Table 1 Set Time Interface State Machine
Set Time Interface State Machine
State State Name Operator Goal
0 Normal Default setting
1 Time Set the time
2 Alarm 1 Set Alarm 1
3 Alarm 2 Set Alarm 2
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Table 2 Transitions for the Set Time Interface
State Machine
The operator uses this state machine to set alarms or the current time but still
needs to enable the alarm. Enabling an alarm on a clock that supports two
alarms requires the user to select which alarm is active. For example, if an
operator sets an alarm on alarm 1 and wants to wake up on this alarm, he must
choose to make alarm 1 active. The designers created two state machines
supporting this: first, the Active Alarm state machine controls the active alarm;
second, the Clock Radio state machine controls whether or not the clock should
alarm. These are described below.
Active Alarm State Machine
The Active Alarm state machine chooses the active alarm. This can be alarm 1,
alarm 2, or both. In the case of both, the alarm clock will alarm on both alarms.
Figure 33 shows the state machine.
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Transitions for the Set Time Interface State Machine
*0 (Operator
Transition State Change 0* (Operator Actions) Indicators)
Operator Press and Hold Pressure on
a 0->1 Time Switch Finger
Operator Release Time
b 1->0 Switch Pressure Released
Operator Press and Hold Pressure on
c 0->2 Alarm 1 Button Finger
Operator Release Alarm 1
d 2->0 Switch Pressure Released
Operator Press and Hold Pressure on
e 0->3 Alarm 2 Button Finger
Operator Release Alarm 2
f 3->0 Button Pressure Released
bAlarm 1
Alarm 2
a
C
1 2
d
Dual
Figure 33 Active Alarm State Machine
Table 3 and Table 4 show the states and transitions respectively. When one
examines these states, one notices that the associated operator goals read as
"Alarm on Alarm 1" meaning the operator wishes to alarm on the first alarm.
This seems somewhat artificial. When one uses an alarm clock, one thinks in
terms of waking at a particular time, not waking at alarm 1, which is ambiguous.
One also notices that some of the transitions indications (in Table 4) to the
operator depend on "Clock Radio" in a particular state. "Clock Radio" refers to
the Clock Radio state machine, which is described later.
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Table 3 Active Alarm State Machine
Active Alarm State Machine
State State Name Operator Goal
0 Alarm 1 Alarm on Alarm 1
1 Alarm 2 Alarm on Alarm 2
2 Dual Alarm on both
Table 4 Transitions for the Active Alarm State
Machine
Transitions for the Active Alarm State Machine
State 0* (Operator
Transition Change Actions) *0 (Operator Indicators)
Clock Radio in "Auto"
0 Toggle to Center
0 Physical Clicks
a 0->1 Toggle To * ALM 1 light offAlarm 2 * ALM 2 Light On
Otherwise
* Toggle to Center
* Physical Clicks
Clock Radio in "Auto"
* Toggle to Left
* Physical Clicks
b Toggle to ALM * ALM 1 light On
1 * ALM 2 Light Off
Otherwise
" Toggle to Left
* Physical Clicks
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Clock Radio State Machine
The clock radio state machine controls whether or not the radio is playing, the
radio is off, or the alarm is armed. When the state machine is "off', the clock is
silent and will not alarm. When it is "on", the radio is on and when it is "auto"
the clock is silent, but will alarm at a set time. Figure 34 shows the state machine.
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Transitions for the Active Alarm State Machine
State 0* (Operator
Transition Change Actions) *0 (Operator Indicators)
Clock Radio in "Auto"
" Toggle to Right
* Physical Clicks
* ALMi1light On
c 1->2 Toggle to Dual * ALA 2 light On
" ALM 2 Light On
Otherwise
* Toggle to Right
" Physical Clicks
Clock Radio in "Auto"
* Toggle to Center
* Physical Clicks
d 2->1 Toggle to ALM * ALM 1 light off2 * ALM 2 Light On
Otherwise
" Toggle to Center
* Physical Clicks
bdQ
Auto
Figure 34 Clock Radio State Machine
Table 5 Clock Radio State Machine
Clock Radio State Machine
State State Name Operator Goal
0 On Listen To Radio
1 Off Clock Silent
2 Auto Enable Alarm
Table 6 Transitions for the Clock Radio State
Machine
Transitions for the Clock Radio State Machine
*0
State 0* (Operator
Transition Change (Operator Actions) Indicators)
a. 0-> 1 Toggle Clock Radio to Off Radio is Silent
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The Goal of the Operator
Next, we identify the principle goals of the operator. For this discussion, the goal
of the operator is to "Sleep through the night and wake up at 6:00."
We next examine those states in the state machines that are consistent with our
goal. Table 7 indicates all states with the inconsistent states struck out (sttek
ettu) and ambiguous states itakicied.
Table 7 Consistent States with the Goal
Clock Radio State Machine
State State Name Operator Goal
-0 4@"Listen Te-Radie
4 Off GAeek-Silen+
2 Auto Enable Alarm
Alarm 1 Setting
State State Name Operator Goal
Set to 6:00 AM
Alarm 2 Setting
State State Name Operator Goal
DONT CARE from the perspective of the operator
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Transitions for the Clock Radio State Machine
*0
State 0* (Operator
Transition Change (Operator Actions) Indicators)
Toggle Clock Radio to Radio can be
b. 1->0 Radio heard
Toggle Clock Radio to Alarm
c. 1->2 Auto Indicator(s) light
Alarm
Toggle Clock Radio to Indicator(s) Turn
d. 2->1 Off Off
Set Time Interface State Machine
State State Name Operator Goal
0 Normal Operate clock standalone
4 Time Set-_etime
_2 _Alaf4 Set,_a_ _ _4
-3 AMafi- setAa 2
Active Alarm State Machine
State State Name Operator Goal
0 Alarm I If Enabled, Alarm on Alarm 1
4 AlAtfm- fE ld Alarmf Ont Alarm 2
f2 Dual If Enabled, Alarm on both
t This state is ambiguous in regard to the goal.
Examining the consistent states, one discovers that it is difficult to determine
whether the dual active-alarm state is consistent with the goal of sleeping through
the night. The reason why it is ambiguous is because alarm 2 is only consistent if
it is set to an time that is not at night. For example, if Alarm 2 is set to 7:00 AM,
then the dual setting is consistent with the goal of sleeping through the night and
waking up at 6:00 AM as long as Alarm 1 is set to 6:00 AM. If Alarm 2 is set to
12:00 AM (this happens to be the default setting after a loss of power), then the
dual setting is not consistent with the goal because the alarm clock will sound at
midnight. The ambiguity in whether or not an automation state is consistent with
an operator goal should alert the designer that there is a potential for mode
confusion.
Even though there is a state that is ambiguous relative to a goal, it may be
possible to train an operator to avoid this state. The likely effectiveness of such
training can be determined by looking at the paths from goal supporting to non-
goal supporting or ambiguous states and vice versa.
For the Clock Radio state machine, there is no clear initial state or entry state.
This is because the state is determined by a three-way switch and thus depends on
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what the operator did with the switch previously. To deal with this, we will
simply exhaustively determine these paths.
Clock Radio State Machine
Table 8 Non-Goal Supporting to Goal Supporting
Transitions
Clock Radio State machine
Non-Goal Supporting to Goal Supporting Transitions
State Operator Operator Indicators
_____________________ Actions _____________
* Radio is silent,
Toggle twice to * ALM (1 or 2 orFrom "On" the right both) light turns on
* Toggle switch
physically clicks
* ALM (1 or 2 or
From "Off" Toggle to the both) light turns on
right * Toggle Switch
Physically clicks
Table 9 Goal Supporting to Non-Goal Supporting
Transitions
Clock Radio State machine
Goal supporting to non-Goal Supporting Transitions
StateOperator Operator IndicatorsActions
SRadio is On,
Toggle twice to hALM (1 or 2 orTo "On'' the left both) light turns off,
* Toggle switch
physically clicks
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Clock Radio State machine
Goal supporting to non-Goal Supporting Transitions
0 ALM (1 or 2 or
To "Off" Toggle to the both) light turns offleft * Toggle Switch
Physically clicks
For the Clock Radio state machine, the three-way switch provides a great deal of
feedback to the operator as to which state the machine is in. Operators can
distinguish the "auto" mode from the "off' mode because the "off" position is in
the center and auto is on the right. If the operator moves the switch, she has
further feedback because the switch clicks and the ALM LEDs change. When
one compares the "auto" mode to the "on" mode, one sees that there is similar
information that distinguishes the two states with the addition that the radio will
make noise.
On the negative side, the naming of the states, "On", "Off', "Auto" is somewhat
cryptic with regard to the meaning of these switches. An operator might assume
that "On" means that the alarm mode is on. All things considered, there are
enough distinguishing characteristics between these states to say that it is not
likely that this switch itself introduces mode confusion.
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Set Time Interface State Machine
Table 10 Non-Goal Supporting to Goal
Supporting Transitions
Set Time Interface State Machine
Non-Goal supporting to Goal Supporting Transitions
State Change Operator Actions Operator
._peatreasTmIndicators
From Time Operator Release Time Pressure Released
____________Switch
From Alarm 1 Operator Release Alarm 1 Pressure ReleasedFrom___A__arm___ Switch PressureReleased
From Alarm 2 Operator Release Alarm 2 Pressure Released
Button
Table 11 Goal Supporting to Non-Goal
Supporting Transitions
Set Time Interface State Machine
Goal supporting to non-Goal Supporting Transitions
State Change Operator Actions OperatorIndicators
To Time Set Operator Press and Hold Pressure on
Time Switch Finger
To Alarm 1 Operator Press and Hold Pressure on
Alarm 1 Button Finger
To Alarm 2 Operator Press and Hold Pressure on
Alarm 2 Button Finger
In this case, all of the goal-supporting states require that the buttons are released
and the non-goal supporting states require that the operator physically push and
hold one of these buttons. Thus, there is no ambiguity of state.
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Active Alarm State Machine
The case study has already identified the "Dual" active alarm state already as
ambiguous in regard to the goal. The worst-case scenario is when dual is NOT
goal supporting, so the discussion will focus on this case.
If Dual is not Goal Supporting
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Active Alarm State Machine
Non-Goal supporting to Goal Supporting Transitions
State Operator
hange O ratos Operator IndicatorsChange Actions
Clock Radio in "Auto"
0 Toggle to Left
* One Physical Click
Move switchFrom left one o ALM 1 light On
Alarm 2 e ALM 2 Light Off
Otherwise
" Toggle to Left
" One Physical Click
Clock Radio in "Auto"
* Toggle to Left
Move switch * Two Physical Clicks
From left two * ALM 1 light On
Dual positions ALM 2 Light Off
Otherwise
* Toggle to Left
e Two Physical Clicks
At first glance, one sees that there is a lot of feedback to the operator when
operators select goal-supporting modes versus non-goal supporting modes.
Closer examination reveals that there is less feedback then one would suppose.
In the first case, one notices that the ALM LED indications depend on whether
or not the clock radio switch is in "auto". This is an inconsistent behavior in the
sense that the feedback to the user regarding a mode change is fed back to the
,user differently depending on some other mode in the system. Additionally we
notice that what distinguishes the dual mode from the alarm 1 mode is the alarm
2 LED. When one refer back Figure 28 Operator Interface, we notice that these
two LEDs are separated in such a way that both are hard to focus on
simultaneously. Thus when the Dual mode is not goal supporting, the LEDs do
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Active Alarm State Machine
Goal supporting to non-G al Supporting Transitions
State Operator
hange O ratos Operator IndicatorsChange Actions
Clock Radio in "Auto"
0 Toggle to Center
M Physical ClicksMove switch to AL 1lgtof
To Alarm 2 right one * ALM1light off
position e ALM 2 Light On
Otherwise
" Toggle to Center
* Physical Clicks
Clock Radio in "Auto"
* Toggle to Right
M Physical ClicksMove switch to eAM1lgtO
To Dual right two e ALAIlightOn
positions * ALM 2 Light On
Otherwise
e Toggle to Right
* Physical Clicks
not provide a very good feedback mechanism and tend to add to mode
confusion.
The conclusion drawn here is that although it is possible to train operators not to
select dual when enabling an alarm, there is poor feedback to the operator as to
whether or not dual is set or alarm 1 is set. This might be particularly
troublesome for those individuals who have difficulty distinguishing left or right.
The consequence of this mode confusion is that sometimes an unexpected alarm
will occur. This is consistent with my own experience-on occasion, the alarm
clock will wake me at midnight. This typically occurs the day after a power failure
because the alarms will get reset to midnight. Although I set alarm 1 to wake me
at my normal time, I consistently do not set alarm 2 and occasionally I set the
clock to dual.
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Chapter 6 Endnotes
None
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Chapter 7
APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK
The previous chapters describe the development of a model that has both an
operator element and an automation element. The model was applied to a simple
alarm clock to illustrate how one could use it to show mode confusion. This
chapter will examine the model's applicability to the more general case by utilizing
Leveson's (Leveson et al., 1997)categories of mode confusion.
As indicated in Chapter 2, Leveson's describes six different categories of mode
confusion problems. She developes these categories in order to help designers
identify mode confusion issues within their design, and thus allow them to
understand the underlying tensions of their designs.
1. Interface interpretation errors
Interface interpretation errors occur when there is ambiguity in the interface
between the operator and the automation. She identifies three different subsets
of these types of errors. The first is a situation where the information provided
by the automation to the operator is dependent on the internal mode of the
system that is hidden from the operator. The second describes a situation where
the information provided from the operator to the automation is mode
dependent and thus, when the operator does not proper interpret the mode, the
automation becomes improperly configured. The last case is when the mode
selection of the automation itself is ambiguous.
In the goal model described in this thesis, it is important that the operator clearly
transmit their intentions to the automation. Operators do this by choosing an
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appropriate automation mode-depending on the task they intend to delegate-
and transmitting the appropriate metric information. This metric information
originates in the operator's mind and as such is encoded in a way that is natural to
the operator. For example, a European pilot might think of wind speed in terms
of meters per second, while an American pilot will think of wind speed in terms
of knots. This mental encoding has an impact on how operators can naturally
transmit information to the automation and interpret performance information
from the automation. Thus this model can be used to model ambiguous interface
problems by examining the natural information encoding of the operator and
comparing the automation encoding.
A similar line of reasoning exists around the monitoring of the automation. The
operator must be able to monitor the automation as it performs some task in the
stead of the operator. If the automation does not generate information that is
consistent with this encoding, then the operator has the additional burden of
converting the information from what the automation generates to something
consistent with her encoding.
In both of the cases described above, the operator is faced with an additional
burden because he must knowingly convert information from automation
encoding to operator encoding. This burden increases when the information
presented is mode dependant, which is often the case. One can find the
problematic states by assuming an operator goal and then identifying the goal-
supporting and non-goal supporting states. For each of these states one identifies
the metric information transmitted to the operator and the corresponding
performance information provided back to the operator. By comparing how this
information is encoded in the goal supporting states and non-goal supporting
states, one can identify scenarios where a non-goal supporting state looks like a
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goal supporting state. Designers should seek to eliminate or clearly separate
these states.
2. Inconsistent Behavior
Leveson uses Carroll and Olsen's definition of inconsistent behavior(Carroll et al,
1988) that states that behavior is inconsistent when like tasks or goals are
matched with unlike actions. When an operator delegates a task to the
automation, he has an expectation that configuring the automation will be the
same every time he uses it. This seems obvious, but it gets tricky when a task
exists in different contexts. For example, the automation may support holding an
altitude as a part of the large goal of departing a terminal area or arriving at a
terminal area. If the automation implements altitude-hold differently depending
on context of the goal, then the automation is exhibiting inconsistency
This thesis models the operator as a goal hierarchy that changes over time. When
combined with the system model, one can associate the system states with
operator goals. For those states that have similar goals, one can examine how the
operator interacts with the automation both in transmitting metric information
and supervising. When these are different then there may be inconsistency in the
automation.
3. Indirect Mode Changes
An indirect mode change is a mode change within the system uncommanded by
the operator. In Leveson's model, such a mode change could be in the
controller, the interface, or in the controlled system itself. An indirect mode
change is not necessarily problematic when the operator anticipates the change.
In some cases, it is desirable-i.e. when the automation switches from a set point
acquisition mode to a tracking mode. For example, consider the case of a pilot
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using automation to seek an altitude. During the time when the aircraft is
climbing, the controller is in a mode that controls the vertical speed of the
aircraft. Once the aircraft begins to approach the target altitude, the controller
enters a mode allowing the aircraft to level-off minimizing the discomfort to the
persons in the aircraft. It becomes problematic when the automation indirectly
changes mode to a state that is inconsistent with the operator's goal.
A designer can find these transitions by choosing an operator goal and separating
the automation states into goal supporting and non-goal supporting sets. He
should identify those transitions between these two sets and then look for
transitions that do not require an operator interaction and do not notify the
operator. For those transitions that are caused by the operator, one should
examine the purpose of the transition. When the purpose does not always imply a
goal cancellation, then there is the potential for the operator to be confused by
the state transition.
4. Operator Authority Limits
Many controllers provide for enforcing constraints on operators in an analogous
manner to hardware interlocks as indicated by Leveson. These types of limits are
conscious decisions made by designers to prevent the operator from making a
mistake leading to an unsafe situation. The question is whether the interlock is
appropriate for the entire domain of operations of the system. This is a harder
question than deciding whether an automation state is consistent with an operator
goal because the interlock exists in the domain of states of the system as a whole.
Since this set of states is a much larger set than simply considering the states of
the automation, it seems difficult to see how to apply the concepts described in
this thesis to this situation.
5. Unintended Side effects
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Leveson describes unintended side effects as when the automation does
something more than what the operator expected. A good example of this comes
from my word-processing software that occurs whenever I try to change the style
of a section of text-for example from regular type to bold type. Whenever I do
this, my software changes all the text that shares the same style not just the text
that I selected. In other words, I only expected to change the type in only the
section I selected, not all the text in my thesis.
The model presented here is this thesis maps automation states to immediate
goals and to context. By examining the goals of these states and the impact of
transitions, one can identify cases where the automation is defeating the higher
level goals of the task. For example, Leveson cites Sarter and Woods in
describing a case where the operators wanted to enter runway change information
into their flight management system (FMS). The FMS obliged them but in the
process cleared out all other information in addition to their runway assignment.
Without looking at the high-level goal, it is impossible to determine whether
clearing the information is appropriate when changing runway information.
Identifying potential side effect issues should be a strength of using the model
described here.
6. Lack of Appropriate Feedback
Leveson describes appropriate feedback is information necessary to determine
the current state of the system, and also information to anticipate the next state
transition. The requirement to understand the current state of the system is
obvious: One cannot use the automation intelligently when one cannot
determine the current state of the system. The ability to anticipate how the state
will transition is extremely important in regards to operator situational awareness.
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This especially important when operator goals are not going to be met especially
when the goal is safety related.
One example cited by Leveson from Sarter and Woods discusses the case of the
Bangalore A320 crash. In this case, the pilot flying-the-aircraft was utilizing the
autopilot to control a descent but did not realize that the other pilot had left his
controls in a state that conflicted with the former's use of the automation. The
model described here could be used to identify these types of problems by
treating the other pilot as an independent event source to the system. By
mapping the primary operator goals to automation states and separating goal-
consistent states from inconsistent-states, one can examine those transitions that
are caused by other operators.
This practice can also be applied to other events or to system trajectories that are
leading to mode changes to non-goal supporting states. Having identified these
events and trajectories, the designer can adjust his design by either providing
useful feedback to the operator, or changing the state transitions.
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Chapter 7 Endnotes
Leveson, N. G., D. L. Pinnelet al. (1997). Analyzing software specifications for
mode confusion potential, Workshopfor Human Error and System
Development.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSION
The intent of this thesis is to describe a model whereas mode confusion problems
can be analyzed as an emergent property of an operator model and an
automation model. The operator, motivated by achieving the objectives of the
system, thinks in terms of those objectives. The automation, on the other hand,
is simply designed to execute certain tasks in support of the operator. As long as
the automation is supporting the objectives of the operator, there is no mode
confusion.
The model of the operator is a hierarchical set of goals. At the highest level, the
goal of the operator is to drive the state of the system to a value state. Since the
transition of the system from an initial state to a value state is in general not a
monolithic act, the operator must manage the intermediate states. The operator
forms lower level goals, which are in the context of the higher goal.
The model of the automation is simply represented by a state machine. This state
machine is combined with the operator model such that each state is either goal
supporting or not goal supporting. Designers gain insight into potential mode
confusion problems by examining whether the change in automation state
represents a change in operator goals. When the automation changes state from
goal supporting to non-goal supporting, then the automation is at cross-purposes
to the operator and mode confusion results.
The thesis next applied this model to a simple case study. The case study
examined an alarm clock that exhibited a number of state machines. The analysis
consisted of identifying all states and transitions of the machine. Next, it stated
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an operator goal and separated the states into goal supporting and non-goal
supporting sets. The analysis revealed transitions that were ambiguous to the
goal of sleeping through the night. This ambiguity pointed to mode confusion
that is a persistent problem with the clock.
While the case study was useful in determining whether the model could be used
to identify specific mode confusion problems, a goal of the thesis was to
determine broader applicability. Thus, the concepts were applied to a broad set
of mode confusion definitions. This section suggested that the concepts
developed here could be applied to most of Leveson's categorizations of mode
confusion.
While this thesis has provided a model for representing mode confusions, there is
quite a lot of work to be done make this into a valuable tool. Areas of research
include
(1) Experimentally validate the model.
The goal model provided a framework for examining mode confusion. The
critical bit of information presented in this thesis is an understanding that
operators think in terms of what they are trying to do while automation is
focused on its immediate tasks. One might ask the question of whether
operators truly think this way or do some operators think in terms of tasks and
others in terms of goals. We may find that it depends on what the operator is
doing and this will have an impact as to the implacability of the model.
Also, the thesis made an assumption of the behavior of operators in that they can
be expected to choose similar goals under similar circumstances. I made this
assumption in order to eliminate the variability of operators. It is not clear that
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the methods of eliminating this variability truly do this or that this assumption has
to be made. Further research can examine this question.
(2) Automating the process of determining mode confusion
The case study presented in this thesis was of a relatively simple machine, a clock
radio. Even so and even after making substantial simplifications, the task will still
fairly weighty. Certainly utilizing the models described in this thesis for
complicated automation may not be practical by hand, but might lend themselves
to automated methods.
One aspect not investigated here is that the goal model and the automation
model might be combined in a Petri-net description. Certainly, there is quite a bit
of work done in analyzing Petri-nets and if the models can be so described,
methods of formally analyzing mode confusion may be found.
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